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INTRODUCTION
There have been a few historical turning points in modern European
history. The turning points of 1648, 1815, 1919 and 1945 had great impact
on the developments of Europe. The last turning point of 1991 is not an
exception to such record. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
liberalization and transition of the former Eastern Europe changed the balance
of power and the European landscape. This article stresses the new role of
the EU as a norm-provider in determining the future outlook of Europe.
Such a new role led to the big bang enlargement in May 2004, which
indicated that the Cold War was sent to the historical dustbin. It also shed
light on the new role of the EU as the most important hegemonic actor in
European politics.
1. BACKGROUND: THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN ORDER
The Cold War European order was a result of the outcome of the World
War II. The historical turning point of 1945 left Europe dominated and
divided by the two victory powers, that is the Soviet Union and the U.S.
These two superpowers laid out their interests in a war-thorn Europe and
divided the region into interest zones in what came to be known as Western
and Eastern Europe. The institutionalization of the Cold war and Western
and Eastern Europe happened through military and economic organizations
(Keohane & Nye 1993: 1–2; Huntington 1991: 92–93). The major changes
in the late 1980s and forward opened for a new post-Cold War Europe
where European interests were allowed to take form. The collapse of the
Soviet Union and the loss of the main reason for U.S. presence in Europe,
implied closer ties between the former Eastern and Western Europe. The
reinstitutionalization process in Europe included the dissemination of Western
norms and an international socialization by Western agents. The West
provided teaching or nursing activities towards the former Eastern Europe.
The most powerful agents were the EU and NATO. These organizations
stood out as the community-building agents and wielded powerful and
persuasive influence on the region by symbolizing security, political freedom
and economic prosperity. However, there were also governments and NGO’s
involved as western socialisation agents (Ikenberry 2001: 3–49; Schimmel-
fennig 2002: 6–9).
The end of the Cold War forced European organizations to adapt
to a new European order. As the former Eastern European states aimed
to integrate the West and rejoin Europe, pressure escalated towards the
Western organizations to meet such demands. This process consisted of
guidance and assistance from Western organizations, but also of an internal
reformation of these organizations to meet the external demands (Schim-
menlfennig 2002: 1).
2. THE EU AS A FOREIGN POLICY-MAKER
The developments of the EU1 have had many reinforcing factors. The
idea of economic integration, political structures of federalism, geopolitics
and the U.S. pressure for integration are a few examples of factors behind
the project. However, the EU was primarily born out of the danger of
letting nationalism get free reins in European states. In the 1950s, issues of
peace and stability were related to how to tackle the political distrust and
open hostility between Germany and France. The first step towards the
vision of integration was the formation of a customs union by the Benelux
states in 1948. The plan for a further unified Europe developed in 1950
with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and was followed up
by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 planning for a common market and
a customs union, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and
the European Atomic Energy (EURATOM). Later on, the Single European
Act (1985), the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and
the Nice Treaty (2000) established an ever-closer Union (Winn & Lord
2001: 1–8; Nuttall 2000: 14–31; McCormick 1999: 203–209).
1 The EU is used to describe policies in the past and the present, disregarding other
abbreviations such as EEC/EC/EU.
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The European economic interdependence intensified after World War
II with the enforcement of the Bretton Woods system. Supervised by the
hegemonic power of the U.S., the economy was developed based on free
trade, non-discrimination and stable exchange. At first, the principle of
market economy developed in sharp contrast to the planned economies in
the east. However, in the 1990s, the EU had become the richest single
group of states in the world and with far developed ties to Eastern
Europe.
Besides being a European economic power, the EU has also come to be
a growing political power. The developments within the EU were enhanced
by the European political harmonization emerging from the shadows of the
World War II. One major political change in the 1970s was the fall of
fascism in the Southern Europe. As a result, the EU accepted new members
in Greece, Spain and Portugal. Decades of Cold War hindered further
integration in Europe. However, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe
symbolized a third process of political homogenization of Europe, enhancing
integration of an Eastern-Western European dimension parallel to the earlier
established Northern-Southern dimension (Hettne 1997: 43–44).
The processes of economic and political integration have strengthened
the EU in international affairs, (Smith 2002: 1–9). This development has
opened for a debate on the EU as foreign-policy-maker. For instance, it has
been argued that the EU is not a sovereign entity; the EU rather constitutes
a hybrid of an international organization and a federation. Therefore, as
long as the EU has not developed into a federation, there is no such thing
as a EU foreign policy. The counter-argument has stressed that states are
also heterogeneous with multiple of interests in the government, opposition,
political parties and regional and municipal interests that all in one way or
another are promoting interests. Therefore, disagreement within EU and
heterogeneous interests do not undermine the role of EU as a foreign policy
maker. Another argument has stressed that the EU lacks essential means to
actually implement foreign policy. This debate has referred to the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the lack of edge in EU foreign
policy making (see discussion in Winn & Lord 2001: 15–16). There have,
however, been counter-arguments stressing the unique foreign policy role of
the EU as an economic and political magnet in European affairs. The EU,
as a civilian power, has come to use trade, aid and diplomatic means
toward third states, besides the more recent development of a military rapid
reaction force.
How do we then evaluate the role of the EU in European and inter-
national affairs? Some scholars have preferred to write about the EU in
terms of presence in different policy areas of the international system
(Sjöstedt 1977; Hill 1993). The EU is an entity with more or less foreign
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policy capability depending on what area we focus on. When we focus on
democracy promotion, we know that the EU has become the main pole of
attraction for most democratizing states in Eastern Europe due to the
embodiment of economic and political progress. We also know that the EU
is a global symbol of deep regionalism, compared to other regional arran-
gements in the world, and has come to have a great magnet effect beyond
Europe. In short, ‘‘Peripheral countries have been centripetally attracted to
the European centre, not to driven away from it’’ (Rosecrance 1998: 16).
3. THE EU AS A DEMOCRACY PROMOTER
The historical overview of Western democracy promotion shows asym-
metrical patterns. It is the most powerful actors that have been able to
dictate the conditions for democracy promotion as well as the nature of the
democracy promoted. The most powerful democracy promoters have been
relatively stable states with democratic governance and market economies,
while the targeted states have lacked democratic patterns and been quite
unstable and economic less successful. This has made the targeted states
dependent on the promoter by adopting the political and economic structures
and values of the promoter.
The issue of democracy promotion gained importance out of the ashes
of World War II and the defeat of totalitarian systems such as Nazism and
Fascism. Democracy was further promoted during the Cold War against
Communism. The overall promotion of democracy was viewed as a vaccine
for a better world (Whitehead 1996: 8–15). For instance, the Western
post-World War II democracy promotion appeared through President Ro-
osevelt, but also through Prime-Minister Churchill which both in the Atlantic
Charter advocated ‘‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government
under which they will live’’ (in Whitehead 1986: 5). The Truman Doctrine
further expressed democratic principles as a strategy against communist
expansion and which was institutionalized in the NATO Treaty of 1949
where the U.S. with Western European states committed to ‘‘safeguard the
freedom founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the
rule of law’’ (in Whitehead 1986: 5). President Carter also promoted
democracy and human rights in late 1970s that included human rights issues
as a guideline for U.S. foreign policy. (Whitehead 1986)2.
2 It is, however, important to remember that official statements did not always lead
to actual implementation of such standards. Instead, in many time’s practical obstacles or
other foreign policy interests undermined for the promotion of democracy (Whitehead 1986:
p. 5–7, 14).
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4. THE POLICY
The asymmetrical relation between the democracy promoter and the
targeted state has also been obvious in European politics of the 1990s and
then foremost between the EU and nonmember states. The democracy
promotion by the EU has been based on the activities of the OSCE, UN
and the Council of Europe. The main root has been the Universal Declaration
of 1948 and the development of the International Covenants of 1966. The
EU adopted the universal principles stressed in the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and complementary documents in International Covenant on
Civil and Political and International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. However, the first political step towards developing an
official democratic criteria for better relations and potential membership
were developed in the 1970s towards Southern European states (Kubicek
2003: 8). The democratic principle was stressed in article 237 of the Rome
Treaty and further specified in the 1962 Birkelbach Report of the political
committee of the European Parliament. The EU stressed that integration to
the Union required certain political conditions. The actual test of the
democratic principle occurred when Greece changed regime through the
coup of 1967; this appeared when Greece had association status with EU.
However, such association was frozen and EU declared that integration
could not take place with dictatorial regimes. Greece came to join the EU
in 1981 followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986 after years of political
converging. The Southern European democratization indicated how the EU
had the role of being an alternative model to the authoritarian regimes (see
Pridham 1991).
The Cold War context was, however, an obstacle for the EU as democ-
racy promoter. The EU was less developed and less coherent in its external
relations, which was also an obstacle for a determined democracy promotion
strategy towards Southern Europe. The impact on Eastern Europe of the
1990s has been stronger compared to towards Southern Europe of the
1970s. With the collapse of communism and the ideological victory of the
West, the end of the Cold War served western ideas (Pridham 1994: 24–25).
However, the end of the Cold War also challenged the EU by the growing
attraction the Union received from surrounding states. Instead of dealing
with internal deepening, the EU was asked to enlarge the Union and put an
end to the historical detour of communism (Smith 2002: 15). The EU stood
out as a political and economic giant in Europe and a symbol of Western
prosperity and democratic freedom, which most of the postcommunist
societies longed for. It was the EU more than the single member states that
the postcommunist states were interested in improving their relations to.
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The first reaction from the EU after the transformations in Eastern Europe
was caution and introspection. However, as the frustration rose among the new
democracies, the EU began the process of meeting the demands from the East.
From 1992–1993 and forward, the EU came to promote its interests by
building an expanded norm-community. It was stated that an enlargement
would reintegrate Eastern Europe to Western European standards of democracy
and market economy (Cremona 2003: 1–2; Smith & Timmins 1999).
In 1992, in a report to the Lisboan European Council, the Commission
restated three conditions for membership to the EU; a European identity,
a democratic government and protection of human rights. The Commission
also stressed that any new member state had to include and implement the
Community system. These conditions were discussed and officially stated in
June 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council. In a time of disintegration
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the EU stated that widening of the
Union had to reinforce the deepening of the Union. If each and every
Member State firmly institutionalized the fundamental principles of the
Union, enlargement would not endanger the norm-community. At the Copen-
hagen Summit by the European Council in 1993, it was officially stated
that EU membership required: a) stability of institutions guaranteeing democ-
racy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of
minorities, b) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union and c) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
The Maastricht Treaty of November 1st, 1993 also stressed human rights
and democratic principles as main objectives of the external relations. The
Maastricht Treaty of 1993 set out the promotion of human rights, democracy
and rule of law as essential part of the official development policy. New
budget lines were established and these were placed under the Initiative for
the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights, managed by the Commis-
sion in 1994. Over the 1990s, the EU worked hard on mainstreaming the
objectives of democracy and human rights protection into all external and
internal activities. For instance, in 1995 a new democracy clause was agreed
upon stressing the suspension of aid and trade provisions in countries with
democratic falls. This democracy clause included all third state agreements.
The Commission Communication of 1995 (216) on the Inclusion of Respect
for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between the
Community and Third Countries stated
A commitment to respect, promote and protect human rights and democratic principles is a key
element of the European Community’s relations with third countries. These issues have been
gradually incorporated into the Community’s activities over a period of time through a series of
commitments culminating in the insertion of explicit references to human rights and democratic
principles in the body of the Union Treaty (1995, (216): 1).
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The Amsterdam Treaty also recognized democracy as a fundamental con-
dition for membership by updating Article 237 of the Rome Treaty. Article
6 of the Amsterdam Treaty reaffirmed that the EU ‘‘is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member
States’’. It was further argued in Article 7 that serious and persistent breaches
of human rights by EU member states would be met by sanctions. This
mechanism of sanctions was further stressed in the Treaty of Nice in
December 2000.
5. THE ORGANIZATION
The responsibility for democracy promotion has been divided between the
intergovernmental and supranational structures of the EU; between pillar one
and pillar two. The Commission, supported by the European Parliament, has
under the first pillar included democratic principles and human rights in all
agreements with third states. Also, under the second pillar, the CFSP has
stressed the promotion of democracy, rule of law and protection of human
rights as part of the foreign policy goals of the Union. The coordination of
policies, between the Council, Parliament and Commission, was highlighted
in 1995 and resulted in a series of Communications from the Commission to
the Council and Parliament (Sacristan-Sanchez 2001: 70–71).
The complexity of the Union has had consequences on the issue of
democracy promotion. As the EU constitutes a unique regional union, it has
also developed a unique structure of institutions and practices, which have had
impact on the capacity to promote democracy. Over the 1990s, democratic
assistance developed rapidly. However, it was obvious that there was no
overreaching unit that evaluated the consequences of the given democracy aid
or calculated on the amounts spent on different projects. The Commission
notified the unstructured democracy assistance and decided to set up a human
rights and democratisation unit. At first, however, its authority was strictly
limited and few methods could be taken to organize the different projects
going on within the different geographical units within the Commission itself
as well as between the Commission and the Member States. In the mid 1990s
there was a growing tension between the efforts made by the Commission and
by the single Member States on democracy assistance where the Commission
was questioned on its legal basis. However, in 1999, the Commission received
legal basis through the decision to introduce two new resolutions. This was
followed by an internal debate and evaluation of the lack of organization and
efficiency that surrounded the work on democratic assistance.
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The reconstruction of the Commission in 1999 and forward resulted in
a new department that was supposed to oversee and coordinate the work on
democratic assistance by receiving all authority on these issues from the
geographical units. The democracy and human rights unit aimed at injecting
democratic principles and human rights into the daily work done by the
Commission towards regions and single states. It also aimed at increasing
the transparency of the work done and to develop a coherent approach to
issues of democracy and human rights.
By looking at the organizational structure of the EU under the command of
the Commission, several different Directorate General have been developed
aiming at expanding and guaranteeing a significant important role of the EU in
world and European affairs. The Directorate-General for External Relations
functions as coordinator of all external relations activities of the Commission.
The main mission has been to develop coherent approaches in external
activities towards non-EU members in Europe. The DG is also coordinating all
other relations with North America, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia
as well as with other international organizations. Such work occurs through
participation in the CFSP, but also through administrating more than 120
Commission Delegations as External services. The Directorate-General for
Development formulates development cooperation policies for developing
countries in the world; in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states. The main
mission of the DG Development is to foster sustainable development and
fighting poverty through economic integration. The Directorate-General for
Enlargement has been responsible for the enlargement of the Union. This
meant handling the pre-accession process, accession negotiations and supervi-
ses all bilateral relations with candidate countries. The Directorate-General for
Trade has had the mission to maximize the EU and member state influence in
international trade and to formulate common trade policy aiming at harmoniza-
tion of world trade, progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade
and lowering of customs barriers. It is in the massive work done by the EU
and the different DG’s that the democratic criterion has become an essential
mandatory clause for targeted states.
6. THE EU AND POSTCOMMUNIST STATES
The collapse of communism and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s
was of historical change. In 1989, over 20 states were defined as communist
regimes in the world. Five years later, only five communist regimes existed
and none of these were located in Europe (China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea
and Vietnam) (Holmes 1997: 3–4). The former communist states in Europe
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had turned away from communism into something new and unexplored;
what often been referred to as the status of postcommunism. The postcom-
munist states faced multiple transitions in democratization and marketization,
as well as the development of a civil society. Overall, it is fair to say that
the postcommunist states faced a more troublesome transformation than
what was seen in the 1970s among the right-winged authoritarian systems
(Rupnik 1999: 57–62).
The postcommunist states met many specific obstacles in their democ-
ratization process of the 1990s and forward. These were transition problems
that the transit from a dictatorial system into a democratic system. These
problems concerned how to reconstruct political life in accordance with
democratic principles and how to deal with the excommunist structures and
actors. There were also contextual problems surrounding the political life in
economic depression and social inequalities as well as religious and ethnical
challenges. Finally, the postcommunist systems faced more general systematic
problems that also exist in consolidated democracies. Such problems included
the inability to make decisions, ill economic performances and administrative
over-kill (Huntington 1991: 208–210). Some prominent experts on Eastern
Europe have pinned down what they find as the most challenging obstacles
for the postcommunist states to overcome. They have argued that the
obstacles for further democratization have been decades of authoritarian
legacy, party and political fragmentation with extreme multipartyism, xenop-
hobia and nationalism with right-wing radicalism, legal arbitrariness, weak
civil society, political illegitimacy, economic crisis, uneven economic and
social developments within and between states, stagnation of the physical
environment, wars, ethnical heterogeneity and tension over minority rights
(Berglund, Aarebrot, Vogt & Karasimeonov 2001; Karvonen 1997; Zhelyu
1996; Rupnik 1999).
In 2001 (ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union) it was possible
to see how the postcommunist states had tackled such obstacles with different
outcomes. The former Soviet republics were less democratized than the
former satellite states of Eastern Europe. The Freedom House Surveys of
2001 (and forward), in Nations in Transit 2001, showed how the gap had
widened between the Eastern European states and the former Soviet Repub-
lics (except the Baltic States) in the average democratization rate. By 2001,
the average democratization scores for the Eastern European countries were
2.82 (partly free) and in the former Soviet republics 5.29 (not free) (Karat-
nycky 2001: 15–17). In other words, the consolidation process was far more
developed in Eastern Europe than in the post-Soviet territory with the
exception of the Baltic States. Such democratic gap has continued to exist
which was recently symbolized by the enlargement process of the EU
including Eastern European states.
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The end of the Cold War led to multiple EU relations in the postcom-
munist region. Until the 1980s, the overall relation between the communist
states and Western Europe had been quite weak. The Soviet Union refused
to recognize the EU and the EU was unwilling to recognize the hegemonic
role of the Soviet Union in the area. A major shift in relations came with
the policies by Gorbachev who stressed the importance of better relations to
Western Europe and the right of each and every communist state to set up
business relations to the West. This resulted in the recognition of the
diplomatic status of COMECON and the EU as well as in trade relations
with most of the Eastern European countries. The reaction from the EU to
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was met by satisfaction. This
satisfaction was obvious in the G7 summit in Paris in 1989 when Western
leaders decided to implement a technical assistance program, coordinated by
the EU Commission. The Phare program focused on Poland and Hungary,
but was soon extended to other states. This laid out the foundation for
further relations between the EU and the Eastern European countries.
7. SUCCESSFUL CONDITIONAL COOPERATION
As the most institutionalised democracy promoter in Europe, the EU has
come to develop relations to all subregions and states in Europe. Based on
the idea of enlarging the EU and the democratic zone in Europe, the EU
has used the mechanism of conditional cooperation to influence postcom-
munist states. The mechanism of conditional cooperation has included
membership of the EU if there is a domestic implementation of democratic
governance. Those remaining states that seek another political path than the
democratic one, is therefore most likely to also be excluded from the
norm-community.
The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 included 10 new Member
States and symbolized the success of the new member states in their internal
political transformation. However, it also symbolized the success of the EU
to internally adapt to a new era of European politics and spread the
democratic norm-community eastward in Europe. The latest big bang enlar-
gement should be seen as a recipe on the work done within the EU to
become the main norm-provider in European politics. Such new role has
been based on an internal reformation leading to an external policy within
the area of democracy promotion. The role of the EU has come to be not
only to consolidate an existing norm-community, but also to promote
democratization eastward. The up-coming challenges for the EU exist in the
less democratized subregions of former Soviet territory and on the Balkans.
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These regions are severe challenges to the idea of European integration and the
expansion of the EU as a norm-community. However, efforts have been taken
and the 1990s has taught us that integration is possible through the democracy
promoted by the EU. We can see how the EU has developed external relations
to post-Soviet territory in Europe in for instance the Ukraine, Georgia and
Moldova as well as to the states in the Balkans stressing the implementation of
democratic governance in these regions. Based on the newly expanded EU,
there is also a greater chance of future enlargement processes that include new
democracies in the remaining non-EU regions of Europe.
FINAL REMARKS
This article set out the changing post-Cold War European landscape and
stressed the growing importance of the EU in determining the future outlook
of Europe. The collapse of the bipolar structures in international relations
opened for the EU as the new norm-provider in Europe. Such new role was
also facilitated by the interest from postcommunist states in Eastern Europe
to join the political and economic Union and rejoin Europe. These demands
from the East made the EU reorganize its external relations in policy and
organization. As a consequence, the EU became an even stronger democracy
promoter in European affairs. The enlargement process of May 2004, with
10 new member states, was a great symbol of the transformation done
within the EU and its role as democracy promoter in the new Europe. The
on-going process of European integration has taken the EU towards the task
of working for future enlargements, including post-Soviet territory in the
East and the Balkans in the Southeast.
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